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Mr. Justice Cardozo, "Discrimination so subtle is a feat h~. 
yond the compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating 
clang of those accusatory words would drown all weaker 
sounds. It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoana-
lysts, that our rules of evidence are framed." (Shepard v. 
United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 [54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196].) 
Such a declaration could not be admitted without the risk 
that the jury would conclude that it tended to prove the acts 
of the defendant as well as of the declarant, and it is clear 
that the prosecution used the declaration to that end. There 
is no dispute as to the identity of the deceased or as to where 
she was at the time of her death. Since the evidence is over-
whelming as to who the deceased was and where she was 
when she met her death, no legitimate purpose could be served 
by admitting her declarations of what she intended to do on 
the evpning of November 22d. The only purpose that could 
be served by admitting such declarations would be to induce 
the belief that the defendant went out with the deceased, 
took her to the scene of the crime and there murdered her. 
Rer declarations cannot be admitted for that purpose with-
out setting aside the rule against hearsay. 
The evidence in question was so damaging to the defendant 
that it cannot reasonably be said that it probably had no 
effect on the jury's verdict. (People v. Putnam, 20 CaI.2d 
885, 892, 893 [129 P.2d 367].) 
Edmonds, J., concurred 
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GIBSON, C. J.-Pursuant to the will of Alfred Easter, 
certain property was distributed by the probate court in 
trust during the life of his wife. On the wife's death the 
trustee filed a final account and petitioned for instructions 
and for distribution. From portions of the resulting decree 
these appeals were taken, which are presented on a joint bill 
of exceptions. 
The will, executed March 30, 1920, provided that the 
trustee should pay to the testator's wife, Catherine, $300 a 
month during the term of her natural life, and the balance 
of the net income was to be divided among his children by 
a former marriage as follows: one-third to his son, Ephraim, 
and two~thirds in equal shares to his three daughters, Kate 
B. Gherky, Elizabeth R. Marriott, and Martha B. Todd. The 
share of any child who might die was to be paid to his or her 
issue per stirpes, and if the son left a wife, but no issue, she 
was to be paid one-half of his share and the remainder was 
to be divided among the daughters. There was a spendthrift 
provision as to such income, and a provision that the trustee 
should allow the wife Catherine to live on certain property, 
or should provide another home for her rent-free. The trust 
was originally to terminate upon the death of the survivor 
of his wife and four children, and it was provided that "Upon 
the termination of this trust my said Trustee shall convey, 
deliver and pay over all the corpus of said trust fund then 
in its possession or under its control unto my heirs at law in 
accordance with the present statute of succession of the State 
of California." The will recited that the estate consisted 
largely of community property, but that the wife had agreed 
that the provisions of the will were for her best interests. 
The will provided that if she should elect to take a share of 
the community property all provisions for her benefit should 
lapse and the net income from the trust should go to the 
children. Endorsed on the will was an agreement by the 
wife to take under its terms and not to claim any part of 
the estate as her share of the community property. 
By a codicil dated May 2, 1921, the testator provided that 
the trust should terminate upon the death of his wife Cath-
erine and that on the death of his son Ephraim, leaving a 
widow but no issue, the whole of the net income from the 
trust, after payment of the $300 to the testator's wife, should 
be paid in equal shares to his three daughters and the son's 
widow. In a second codicil dated January 13, 1922, the testa 
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directed that certain other real property should not be sold 
tor devised certain real property to his wife and son, and 
by the trustee during the lifetime of his wife. 
When the testator died on February 2, 1923, his only heirs 
were his wife, Catherine, and his four children. The wife 
filed in the probate proceeding an election to take under the 
will and to waive "any claim which she might make or aSsert 
in or to any of the property of said estate by reason of any 
community interest or share that she may have or be entitled· 
to therein." The decree of distribution, dated October 3, 1923, 
set forth directions for administering the trust and provided 
that" Upon the death of the said Catherine Easter, the trust 
hereinbefore referred to shall terminate and all of the prop-
erty then in the hands of the trustee or in its possession or 
control, shall go to and vest in the heirs at law of the said Al-
fred Easter, deceased, in accordance with the statute of succes-
sion of the State of California in force in the month of MarCh., 
1920, and the trustee is directed to convey, deliver and pay over 
all the corpus of said trust funds then in its possession or 
under its control unto such heirs in accordance with the 
statute of succession of the State of California in force in the 
month of March, 1920." (Italics added.) 
Prior to the death of the wife Catherine, on January 8, 
1942, but after the testator's death, the daughter Kate B. 
Gherky died, leaving two daughters, Grace Winkler and 
Kathleen Broadridge. During the same period the son Eph-
raim died without issue, but left a widow who also died before 
the death of Catherine. When the trust terminated upon 
Catherine's death, the trustee instituted the present proceed-
ing and the lower court ordered the corpus to be distributed 
one-third to each of the surviving daughters of the testator, 
Martha B. Todd and Elizabeth R. Marriott, and the one-third 
share of the deceased daughter to the two granddaughters, 
Grace Winkler and Kathleen Broadridge. Appeals from this 
portion of the decree were taken by the administrator with 
the will annexed of the estate of the son Ephraim, and by 
the administrator with the will annexed of the estate of the 
testator's wife Catherine. 
The question for decision is whether the identity of the 
"heirs at law" (who were to take on termination of the trust) 
is to be determined as of the time of death of the testator or 
the time of termination of the trust. If the interests of the 
'" 0.24-7 
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heirs vested at the time of termination of the trust rather 
than at the time of the testator's death, then the estates of 
the testator's wife and son would take nothing because of 
their prior deaths, and the decree must be affirmed. 
' The appeUants contend that the devise of a remainder to 
"heirs" or to others determinable at the time of the testator's 
death passes a vested remainder as of that time in the absence 
of a contrary intention clearly expressed, and that there is 
no evidence in the record, either in the stipulated facts, the 
testamentary 'documents or the 1923 decree of distribution 
to sustain a finding that the testator intended to postpone the 
vesting and thus limit participation in the remainder interest 
to his blood relatives living at the termination of the trust. 
On the other hand, the respondents point to a number of 
provisions in the will and the 1923 decree as indicating an 
intention that the corpus of the trust should vest in the testa-
tor's children, or the lawful issue of any deceased child per 
stirpes, upon the termination of the trust. 
[1] It is settled, however, as conceded by the appellants, 
that the effect of a will is controUed by the decree of distribu_ 
tion when final. The decree is said to be "conclusive as an 
ascertainment and adjudication of the terms of the trust, and 
of the rights of all parties claiming any legal or equitable 
interest under the will. (Goad v. Montgomery, 119 Cal. 552 
[51 P. 681, 63 Am.St.Rep. 145J ; Williams v. Marx, 124 Cal. 
22 [56 P. 603J; More v. More, 133 Cal. 489 [65 P. 1044,].) 
The decree supersedes the will and prevails 'over any pro-, 
vision therein which may be thought' inconsistent with the 
decree.' (Goad v. Montgomery, 119 Cal. 552 [51 P. 681, 
63 Am.St.Rep. 145J.)" (Keating v. Smith, 154 Cal. 186, 191 
[97 P. 300J.) In Luscomb v. Fintzelberg, 162 Cal. 433, 438 
[123 P. 247], the court stated, "It was equally within the 
jurisdiction of the court, and its duty, to determine . . . 
what other persons had legal or equitable rights to the dis-
tributable property of the estate, and the extent and nature 
of their interests. Having jurisdiction to determine these' 
matters on distribution, when the decree does so determine 
them, although the determination may be incorrect, it is con-
clu~ive as to the rights of heirs; legatees; and devisees unless 
corrected on appeal. It is not subject to collateral attack or 
to be impeached by resort to the terms of the Will., 'The rights 
of the parties must thereafter be determined by resort to the, 
decree of distribution alolle as a final and conclusive ,adjudi-
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cation of the testamentary disposition which the deceased 
made of his property." (See, also, Estate of Wallace, 11 
Cal.2d 338 [79 P.2d 1094]; Estate of Goldberg, 10 Cal.2d 
709 [76 P.2d 508].) This being so, the determination of this 
cause turns upon the proper construction of the decree of 
distribution. 
[2] We find no uncertainty or ambiguity in the decree of 
distribution. It expressly provides that "Upon the death of 
the said Catherine Easter the trust ... shall terminate and 
all of the property then in the hands of the trustee or in' its 
possession or control, shall go to and vest in the heirs at law 
of the said Alfred Easter, deceased," in accordance with the 
1920 statute of succession. (Italics added.) This portion of 
the decree was properly construed by, the trial court herein 
to distribute a contingent interest only to the heirs, the con-
tingEmcy being their survivorship of the testator',s wife, upon 
whose death the trust terminated. In other words, the inter-
est of the heirs was to vest only upon their surviving such 
'termination of the trust~ The decree of distribution, by pro-
viding that two things should occur "Upon the death of the 
,said Catherine Easter, " namely, 1. "the trust .,. shall 
, terminate," and 2. "all the property then in the hands of 
the trustee . . . shall go to and vest in the heirs at law of 
said Alfred Easter, deceased," clearly indicates an intention 
that the interests of the heirs should vest at the time of the 
termination of the trust. Any other construction woUld ignore 
the normal and usual meaning of the words "shall go to and 
vest in the heirs at law." ' 
[3] Appellants urge, however, that use of the future tense 
of verbs 'in devising or distributing a remainder biterest' do~ 
not militate against it vesting on the death 'of the testator, 
citing Esta'te of Wallace, 11 Ca1.2d 338 [79 P.2d 19941 ; 
Estate otDunphy, 147 Cal. 95 [81 P. 315] ; 'and Estale of 
Newman, 68 Cal.App. 420 [229 P. 898]. 'These decisions 'are 
not controlling here. The Wallace case involved the meaning 
of "shall distribute" and the other cases dealt with the con-
struction of wills. From their nature, 'wills' 'are made to' take 
effect at a future time, i.e., at the death of the testator, 'and 
hence it may be proper to construe the future tense when 
used in a will as applying to the time of the testator's deilth, 
and not to a still later time. A decree of distribution, on the 
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usually an order for the present delivery of property, and 
the use of the future tense must ordinarily connote future 
action. In our opinion, such was the intention here. 
The testator's widow claimed no rights in hostility to the 
will, but the administrator of her estate claimed that the re-
mainder estate should be distributed as community and not 
as separate property_ However, he concedes that the com-
munity question "may be ignored if this Court should sus-
tain that part of the decree below holding that the widow 
and son took no part of the remainder interest as devisees 
under Mr. Easter's will or as distributees under the 1923 
decree" of distribution. We therefore find it unnecessary to 
discuss the problems and contentions relating to the char-
acter of the property and the effect of the widow's election 
or waiver, if any, of her claims to such remainder interest. 
Those portions of the decree appealed from directing dis-
tribution of the corpus of the trust property are affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, 
J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-The majority OpInIOn rests 
entirely on the decree of distribution. It holds that the decree 
is neither uncertain nor ambiguous and that its provision 
that the property, upon the termination of the trust, "shall 
go to and vest in the heirs at law" clearly indicates that the 
interests of the heirs were to vest at the time of the termina-
tion of the trust. The word "vest," however, has more than 
one meaning (see 44 Words & Phrases (perm. ed. 1940) 191. 
194; 2 Simes, Law of Future Interests, § 347, p. 82; Leach, 
Cases on Future Interests, (2d ed.) 255), and it is not clear 
that the probate court used the word to mean vest in right 
rather than vest in possession. It is hardly conceivable that 
the court would have used such general language had it in-
tended to pass on the question whether the gifts to the heirs 
vested in right upon the death of the testator or upon the 
termination of the trust. 
There is a presumption in favor of the vesting of testa-
mentary dispositions at death. (Prob. Code, § 28, formerly 
Civ. Code, § 1341; Estate of Newman, 68 Cal.App. 420, 424 
[229 P. 898] ; In re De Vries, 17 Cal.App. 184, 190 [119 P. 
109] ), and "words expressive of future time are to be re-
ferred to the vesting in possession if they reasonably can be, 
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rather than to the vesting in right." (Estate of Newman, 
supra, at p. 429; see 49 A.L.R. 186, 187; 127 A.L.R. 609, 610.). 
The decree provides that the property "shall go to" the heirs. 
These are "clear words of direct devise" at the time of death 
(Estate of Wallace, 11 Cal.2d 338, 341 [79 P.2d 1094] ; Keat-
ing v. Smith, 154 Cal. 186 [97 P. 300], and their import is 
not altered by the accompanying word "vest" (In re De 
Vries, supra, at 191-192; Randall v. BlSnk 0/ America, 48 
Cal.App.2d 249 [119 P.2d 754]) or by the provision that the 
trustees shall "convey, deliver and pay.over" the trust fund .. 
(Estate of Wallace, supra; Estate 0/ Newman, supra; see Re-
statement, Property, Future Interests, Parts 3 and 4; § 260.) 
In the light of the foregoing authorities it is clear that the 
decree is open to the construction that the court was referring 
to the vesting in possession of the interests of the heirs. Since 
it cannot be determined from the decree whether the interests 
of the heirs vested in right at the death of the testator or 
upon the termination of the trust; reference must be made 
to the will to ascertain the meaning of the decree. (Estate 0/ 
Goldberg, 10 Cal.2d 709 [76 P.2d 508].) 
The will provides: "This trust shall terminate upon· the 
death of my said Wife Catherine," and "Upon the termina· 
tion of this trust my said Trustee shall convey, deliver and 
pay over all the corpus of said trust fund then in its posses-
sion or under its control unto my heirs at law in accordance 
with the present statute of succession of the State of Cali-
fornia. " Under these provisions the heirs must be determined 
as of the death of the testator. "It is a general rule of 
testamentary construction, so universally recognized as to ren-
der unnecessary a full citation of the cases which support it, 
that in the absence of clear and unambiguous indications of 
a different intention to be derived from the context of the 
will, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, the 
class described as testator's heirs, or such persons as would 
take his estate by the rules of law if he had died intestate, 
to whom a remainder is given by will, is to be ascertained at 
the death of the testator." (Estate 0/ Newman, 68 Cal.App. 
420,424 [229 P. 898] ; Estate 0/ Wallace, 11 Cal.2d 338 [79 
P.2d 1094]; Keating v. Smith, 154 Cal. 186 [97 P. 300]; 
Estate 0/ Ritzman, 186 Cal. 567 [199 P. 783]; Estate of 
1)e Vries, 17 Cal.App. 184 [119 P. 109] ; Randall v. Bank of 
America, 48 Cal.App.2d 249 [119 P.2d 754] ; Estate of alann, 
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177 Cal. 347 [170 P. 833]; In re Rider's Estate, 199 Cal. 
724 [251 P.' 799]; Rest., Property, Future Interests, Parts 
3' and 4, §§ 260, 308 ;33 L.R..A..N.S. 2; 13 .A..L.R. 615; 49 
.A..L.R. 178; 127 .A..L.R. 604.) Such rules of construction are 
as essential as rules of construction for deeds or negotiable 
instruments. Without them counsel could not advise their, 
clients with any reasonable certainty, for the meaning of a' 
will could not be ascertained until it had been passed upon 
by a court of last resort. (See Brown, Problems of Construc-
tion Arising In The Law of Property-Particularly In The 
Law of Future Interests, 79 Pa.L.Rev. 385, 389.) When a 
testator resorts to the word "heirs" after having exhausted 
his specific wishes by the previous limitations, he' states in 
effect that he is content thereafter to let the law take its 
course. (Whall v. Converse, 146 Mass. 345, 348 [15 N.E. 
660); Gilman v. Congregational Home Missionary Society, 
276 Mass. 580 [177 N.E. 621] ; Matter of Bump, 234 N.Y. 60 
[136 N.E.295].) Under the law, which favors the creation 
of vested rather than contingent remainders, the testator's 
"heirs at law" are the persons who answer that description 
at t,he time of the testator's death. (Ibid.) 
'Respondents contend that a different intention can be de-
rived from the context of the will, read in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances. Particular reliance is placed on 
the fact that one of the testator's heirs was his wife, who was 
given a life interest in the same property. If the person to 
whom a life interest in the property has been given is the sole 
heir of the testator, there is some incongruity in also giving 
such a person all the interest under the limitation to "heirs." 
The circumstance of his being the sole heir tends to establish 
that the testator intended the heirs to be ascertained as of the 
death of the sole heir. (Rest., Property, Future Interests, 
Parts 3 and 4, § 308, Comment k, p. 1715; Estate 0/ Wilson, 
184 Cal. 63, 64 [193 P. 581].) When, however, the taker of 
a prior interest is one of several heirs at the testator's death 
"no constructional tendency is sufficiently definite to be cap-
able of statement" (Rest., Property, Future Interests, Parts 
3 and 4, Comment k, p. 1717), and there is nothing to war-
rant the court's departing from the usual meaning of the 
word "heirs." (Estate of Newman, 68 Cal..A.pp. 420 [229. 
P. 898J.) Such a departure would exclude. not simply a 
particular heir, but all the heirs of a testator who die before 
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the particular heir, and would substitute others in their 
place. (See Ferrier, Gifts to Heirs in Oalifornia, 26 Cal.L . 
Rev. 413, 423.) 
, Respondents invoke the rule set forth in Estate 01 Hdrtsd'n, 
218 Cal. 536, 540 [24 P.2d 171], that "where the provisions 
of a will are capable of two interpretations, under one of 
which tho'se of the blood of the testator will take, while under 
the other the property will go to strangers, the interpretation 
by which the property goes to those of the blood of the tes-
tator is preferred." A gift to heirs, however, vests the prop-
erty in those entitled to take under the statute of succession 
(Prob. Code, § 108, formerly Civ. Code, § 1334), and the pro-
vision in the will for the gift of the corpus to the testator's 
heirs "in accordance with the present statute of succession" 
contains no suggestion that the disposition of that corpus is 
limited to heirs who are" of the blood" of the testator. (See 
Estate of Watts, 179 Cal. 20, 23 [175 P.415].) Othel" pro-
visions of the will invoked by respondents are insufficient in 
my opinion to warrant a construction different from the usual 
meaning of the word "heirs." The provisions that the title 
to the home for Mrs. Easter should be vested in the trustee, 
and that the Catalina Court and Sixth Grammercy properties 
should not be sold during the life of Mrs. Easter, do not pur· 
port to qualify the gift over of the remainder interest. Neither 
do the provisions for the payment of income to Ephraim's 
widow during Mrs. Easter's lifetime, nor the references to the 
issue of deceased children, nor the references in the spend-
thrift provisions to income only. ' 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied May 29, 
1944. Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing. 
